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Over the past 20 years the field of electronic markets has seen a considerable proliferation and differentiation. 
This position paper takes the opportunity of the 21st volume of “Electronic Markets” to look back at important 
developments and insights, suggesting a framework that captures the multiple facets and indeed empirical 
breadth and depths of this concept. It comprises three perspectives which include the market environment, gov-
ernance choices by economic actors as well as the entrepreneurial dynamics of firms who initiate and operate 
market platforms as their business. In addition, we propose to study the interplay of technological, market, and 
institutional drivers in order to understand the phenomenon of electronic markets, which is also a precondition 
for designing electronic markets. Both activities involve more than an economically motivated choice between 
the discrete alternatives of markets and hierarchies. Rather, electronic markets are configurations across multi-
ple, interdependent dimensions: Technology is an important force in shaping the field, but needs to be comple-
mented by considerations of the competitive environment and the setting of rules in order to ensure efficient and 
effective plays of the game. Based on this framework, this position paper develops six propositions for the future 
of electronic markets. Overall, the advantages of intermediated structures, an ongoing technological sophistica-
tion, as well as further innovation in market mechanisms and services make electronic markets an enabler for 
many inter-organizational value chains. While we are confident that the ingenuity of inventors will yield a flow 
of innovations, recent economic crises have shed a dark shadow over the sustainability of electronic markets. 
They call for suitable rules and regulation amenable to economic prosperity and stability to be agreed upon on a 
broad level. 
  Twenty Years of Electronic Markets Research, page 2/23 
1. A Brief Retrospective 
It is 20 years that electronic markets emerged as a field of research. While inter-organizational systems, such as 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) in the transportation sector, computer reservation systems (CRS) in tourism 
and electronic exchanges in banking date back even longer, the well-known “Electronic Markets and Hierar-
chies” article (Malone et al. 1987) and research projects, such as the Center for Coordination Science (CCS) and 
the Competence Center Electronic Markets (CCEM) with the journal “Electronic Markets” have marked im-
portant milestones for a more generalized research on electronic markets. As mentioned in the editorial and the 
interview in this jubilee issue of Electronic Markets, the paper on electronic markets spawned a broad academic 
debate, which is still ongoing. It has – directly or indirectly – inspired numerous entrepreneurs to develop elec-
tronic markets. The claim that the development and diffusion of information and communication technology will 
lead to a shift from hierarchical structures to market structures has become known as the “Move to the Market” 
or electronic markets hypothesis (EMH). Although, the number of electronic markets has significantly decreased 
after the e-business hype, there are still 645 electronic markets listed in the directory of electronic marketplaces 
today (E-Market Services 2011). “What we were trying to do […], was to predict broad, historical trends” 
Malone says in the interview covered in this issue. In fact they did, so this position paper takes stock and makes 
sense of the developments over the past two decades and reflects directions for the future. 
In retrospective, electronic markets have two origins. From the technological side, electronic markets comprise 
the application of information technology (IT) to support communication and allocation purposes among multi-
ple actors in one or multiple value chain(s). Well-known examples are Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), elec-
tronic catalogs as well as matching and auction mechanisms. Together with growing standardization these tech-
nologies had important impact on the economic side, in particular the costs of organizing economic activity 
among organizations. These transaction costs are prominent explanations for the feasibility of markets or hierar-
chies and for deriving expectations on future developments, such as the EMH. However, despite the ongoing 
technological innovation in areas such as Internet protocols, electronic trading agents, standards, semantics and 
ontologies, technology does not determine the choice of governance structure. Understanding the organizational, 
strategic and social implications of the IT-based transformation is required to understand the successful adoption 
and operation of electronic markets. While it is not feasible for a position paper to summarize 20 years of elec-
tronic markets’ research, five key insights shall be mentioned. 
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First, Malone et al. (1987) applied the nature of hierarchical relationships also to the inter-organizational setting. 
In particular, transactions between small and large businesses feature asymmetric power constellations which in 
consequence are similar to intra-organizational coordination. This view had important practical implications 
since companies in many industries strived to externalize activities and the electronic integration effect inherent 
in electronic hierarchies has become an important element especially in the business-to-business (B2B) segment. 
Well-known application areas are the outsourcing of IT operation (ITO), application service provisioning (ASP) 
or business processes (BPO).  
Second, it has become clear that electronic markets are far from representing a homogeneous class of systems. 
For example, research on electronic markets in the B2B-area has shown that these hubs may either support sys-
tematic or spot sourcing (Kaplan and Sawhney 2000, 98f). Whereas systematic sourcing is based on long-term 
contracts with a carefully selected number of suppliers, spot sourcing pursues the goal of meeting an immediate 
(or single) demand from a number of competing suppliers. In the former sense, electronic markets would support 
network or even hierarchical relationships and in the latter classical market relationships. However, in both cases 
the respective IT systems would classify as electronic markets.  
Third, the suitability of a specific form of governance cannot be judged based on transaction cost considerations 
only. Production and coordination costs as well as asset specificity and opportunism are not explicitly including 
factors, such as flexibility, adaptability, quality, trust and innovation, which are critical when companies make 
(out-)sourcing decisions. As soon as such non-contractible issues are present, the number of suppliers will be 
limited as the respective business partners are required to make relationship specific investments (Bakos and 
Brynjolfsson 1993, 51). Furthermore, the frequency of exchange, access to knowledge and industry structure, 
also influence the suitable form of governance (Glassberg and Merhout 2007, 54f). Obviously, rather than facing 
just a choice of governance modes, companies use the opportunity to configure complex coordination mecha-
nisms. 
Fourth, the EMH is closely related to contingencies of economic activities. Although IT may have reduced 
transaction and coordination costs as well as extended the scope of products that can be coordinated via market 
principles, the “Move to the Middle Hypothesis (MMH)” highlighted factors, such as market structures and 
transaction risks, which influence the success of market mechanisms (Clemons et al. 1993). These contingencies 
reach from the external environment (e.g. regulation for property rights), market structure (e.g. fragmentation, 
concentration, information asymmetry) to product characteristics (e.g. information intensity, modularized offer-
ings) and business practices (e.g. shared standards, settlement schemes) (Giaglis et al. 2002). 
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Fifth, the financial crisis in 2008 is a reminder of the vulnerability of electronic markets and indeed of the entire 
economic system. The crisis has discredited the effectiveness of market mechanisms as highly complex financial 
products were electronically traded in global markets, which lead to unforeseen and apparently irrational situa-
tions, must recently the Flash Crash on May 6, 2010 (Frydman and Goldberg 2011). Traditional values and prin-
ciples, such as linking economic risk taking and accountability, responsibility and economic prudence, were 
questioned and financial institutions had accumulated debt and risks way beyond their financial means. As the 
financial defaults of these institutions were feared to cause a vicious cycle of financial collapse and ultimately a 
threat to the entire economy, understanding as well as regulating them has become a key concern. 
 
2. Electronic Markets and IT-based Transformation: 
Three Perspectives on Electronic Markets 
In response to these insights of extant research in the electronic markets field and the growing proliferation and 
diversity of electronic markets, three distinct perspectives shall contribute to structuring the electronic markets’ 
phenomenon (see Table 1): The broadest view is the market or industry environment which describes the IT-
driven transformation of national and international markets (see e.g. Castells 1998; Benkler 2006). The second 
view captures the choices of economic actors regarding the governance mode for their business transactions 
(market, hierarchy or network, Williamson 1975, 1991) and related issues of the design and combination of co-
ordination mechanisms. The third view highlights the initiation, development and operation of electronic market 
platforms or market intermediaries as business models and entrepreneurial activity (see e.g. Kambil and van 
Heck 2002; Kaplan and Sawhney 2000). In addition to the technological enablers, this framework also empha-
sizes the role of market forces (market dynamics) and rule setting (institutional design) in order to explain the 
development of electronic markets. 
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Perspectives 
Drivers 
Electronic market as  
economic environment 
Electronic market as  
governance mode 




IT has become a key social 
and business infrastructure. 
IT makes more products and 
services amenable to market 
coordination. 
IT enabled transaction infra-




New rules and levels of com-
petition drive innovation and 
market development. 
Competition between govern-
ance models and between 
electronic markets drives in-
novation of coordination 
mechanisms. 
Competition among electronic 
marketplaces drives service 
innovation and yields com-




Institutional settings shape 
technology development and 
its deployment. 
Political support and regula-
tion facilitate further devel-
opment. 
Electronic markets are social 
institutions.  
Effective regulation reduces 
transaction costs, which im-




Governance and ownership 
structures are success factors 
of electronic marketplaces. 
Table 1: Perspectives on electronic markets and drivers 
Electronic Markets as Economic Environment 
The past twenty years have seen a dramatic rise of the electronic marketspace (e.g. Eskelsen et al. 2009). IT and 
electronic markets have shaped new industries and transformed entire sectors. This applies to e-business compa-
nies (e.g. eBay, Amazon) as well as to software companies (e.g. Microsoft, SAP) and IT service providers (e.g. 
Google, telecom companies). As explained by Kevin Kelly (1998) many of these information-based businesses 
are subject to the “New rules of the network economy”. For example, the rule “more gives more” or “volume 
drives volume” is not only apparent in electronic markets and telecommunication networks, but also in the recent 
rise of social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter. Another contribution for the transformation of the 
entire economic environment is Thomas Friedman’s popular treatise “The world is flat” (2005). In fact, most of 
the ten “flatteners” are results of the digital revolution (e.g. Netscape, workflow software, uploading or “The 
steroids”). In addition, sociologists (e.g. Castells 1998; Benkler 2006) have argued that this emerging electronic 
marketspace leads to profound social, economic and political transformations. Following these insights, this po-
sition paper argues that technological, competitive and regulatory changes need to be considered together in or-
der to understand the impact and the transformation of electronic markets. 
First, electronic markets have become the commercial face of global communication infrastructures yielding a 
tightly networked world that has emerged over the past 20 years. The commercialization of global computer-
mediated communication environments has permeated almost any facet of economic activity. Currently, social 
media - a “social” adoption of global computer-mediated communication environments – provide an impulse for 
a new wave of commercial appropriation of a socio-technical innovation. 
  Twenty Years of Electronic Markets Research, page 6/23 
Second, new competition in the networked economy has transformed the competitive landscape across almost 
any industry. Information transparency has significantly increased, driven by entrepreneurs and innovators who 
created platforms for comparison shopping, product ratings and user generated content. Yet, companies have 
found new ways of avoiding all-out price wars and created new forms of information asymmetries (Glassberg 
and Merhout 2007). The airline industry is a prime example for a technologically driven transformation: low-
cost airlines have changed the product offering to make them more amenable to the Internet (point-to-point con-
nections of unbundled, low-frills flights) as a first step, which was followed by a push towards self-service 
(booking and checking-in online) and an increasing portfolio of service components (e.g. checked luggage) or 
up-selling (more legroom) and cross-selling (rental car or hotel) options offered online. These strategic moves 
may also be seen as an attempt to increase direct sales and bypass online and offline travel intermediaries. Other 
examples are the financial markets, which are often conceived as prototypes of electronic markets, or telecom-
munication markets. The latter feature an intense competition between network access providers within and 
across different technological approaches and architectures: power line, Cable TV, telecom networks/ phone ca-
ble, WIFI etc. Leading to the next point, governments promoted this development as broadband access is regard-
ed as an important factor in the competitiveness of nations and regions.   
Third, governments have been key enablers and facilitators of the electronic marketspace in many areas 
(Fligstein 2001). For example, the industrial policy in the US (National Information Infrastructure), the EU (eEu-
rope), and numerous Asian governments (e.g. Informatization of Nation and Society, Republic of Korea) aimed 
at developing the communication infrastructure for the economy and society at large. Research policy in most 
regions has also led to significant governmental investment into research programmes, which de facto supported 
the private sector. At least in some countries (e.g. the US) taxation policy has been facilitating e-business (the 
sales tax advantage, Stibel 2010). Legal frameworks were crafted in order to balance the risks between service 
providers and consumers, specifically consumer protection and privacy laws e.g. in the EU. Finally, social policy 
addresses issues, such as education, cultural heritage and social inclusion (e-Inclusion) aiming at a broad based 
societal diffusion and support. In sum, technology expertise and familiarity have spread across all segments, the 
business, public sector as well as citizens communities, and have provided an environment for further diffusion 
and growth.   
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Electronic Markets as Governance Mode 
While the predictions of Malone et al. (1987) may also be applied to the broader economic development ad-
dressed in the previous section, they were specifically targeted at the EMH, i.e. the comparative advantage of 
(electronic) market coordination over (electronic) hierarchies. There is ample evidence of the ongoing extension 
of market coordination (in the narrow sense, i.e. auctions, dynamic pricing typically via centralized market plat-
forms) into the electronic sphere. Technological advancements combined with market entrepreneurship have 
driven an extension of market coordination into a broad and diverse array of domains from marketing, to health 
care or forecasting (see Table 2). Price-based coordination mechanisms have benefitted from reduced infor-
mation and brokerage costs and provided extended allocation efficiencies. Moreover, the research field of micro 
market design has contributed to understand issues, such as price building or auction rules (e.g. Bapna et al. 
2004; Neumann 2007).  
Trade objects Examples  
Commodities  Financial markets (e.g. Eurex, CME CBOT) 
 Energy markets (e.g. European Energy Exchange EEX)  
 Agriculture markets (e.g. CME Globex, The Seam) 
 Computing markets (e.g. Grid computing) 
Software   Web service directories (e.g. StrikeIron, RemoteMethods) 
 App stores (e.g. Apple, Microsoft, Nokia) 
Information   Geographic information (Brox and Kuhn 2001) 
 Advertisement exchanges (e.g. Google Doubleclick) 
Predictions  General events (e.g. Intrade) 
 Political outcomes (e.g. Iowa Electronic Market) 
 Video game sales (e.g. Simexchange) 
Rights   Trading CO2 emission rights (e.g. European Union Emissions Trading Scheme) 
Services   Personnel or freelancer services (crowdsourcing, human cloud, microwork) 
 Maternity care auction (Smits and Janssen 2008) 
 Logistics markets (e.g. inet-logistics, Axit, Gudmundsson and Walczuck 1999) 
 Procurement platforms (e.g. Elemica, Supply On, cc hubwoo)  
 Comparison sites (e.g. uswitch, comparethemarket, kelkoo, comparis)  
 Auction sites (e.g. Ebay, Webstore, eBid) 
 Retailing platforms (e.g. Amazon, Grainger, Zalando) 
 Pooling sites (e.g. Groupon, Google Offers) 
Table 2: Examples of products and services traded in electronic markets 
While coordination efficiency, asset specificity and the complexity of product description were included in the 
early model of Malone et al. (1987), they have barely addressed the issue of institutional design, even though 
this is part of transaction cost theory. In fact, successful electronic markets, such as eBay or Amazon, invest sub-
stantial resources in the ongoing development of institutional rules to provide assurance, recommendations, user-
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generated content or to reduce information asymmetries. Moreover, the market players (suppliers) are continual-
ly extending the repertoire of mechanisms to limit transparency and all-out price competition. As suggested by 
Kambil and van Heck (2002) in their book on market design, the design of the transaction processes needs to be 
complemented with shaping of the trade context, i.e. the institutional design.  
Electronic Markets as Business Model 
The third perspective focuses on centralized market structures and takes the view of marketplace operators. They 
are intermediaries that address information imperfections (Spulber 1996, 136). Their success is ultimately deter-
mined by transaction volumes and the bid-ask spread.
1
 Research on intermediation in financial markets has con-
tributed various models for determining the bid-ask spread and confirmed welfare effects (e.g. Cosimano 1996). 
While it highlights the price discovery function, it also recognizes that technology has provided multiple other 
sources of value for intermediaries. This leads to the first driver, which captures the influence of IT enabled 
transaction infrastructures on innovative value propositions. Following the functionalities of electronic market 
platforms (Bakos 1998, 35f; Giaglis et al. 2002, 233ff), the business models for electronic markets are manifold 
(e.g. Dai and Kauffman 2002) and include various sources of value as listed below. 
 Message handling: Following the idea of clearing centers known from the EDI field, the translation of 
message formats is still an important function when messages are to be exchanged automatically be-
tween applications. Compared to the early offerings today’s standards are based on XML subsets and 
also include the mapping of activity chains. Using business process definitions from RosettaNet’s pub-
lic-private processes, providers, such as GXS and e2open offer message handling in the electronics in-
dustry.  
 Transaction execution, including trade context processes: Due to their topological advantages, markets 
are valuable infrastructures for the facilitation of standardized transactions. As prominent examples, 
Amazon and eBay provide professional services from the shopping cart to logistics and payment, fraud 
detection and buyer protection. Amazon even offers their services to competing third party providers in 
the marketplace section and sells individual services as Amazon Web Services.  
                                                          
1
 The bid-ask spread reflects the value added by intermediaries and consists of the costs of processing orders, 
holding inventory and adverse selection (Huang and Stoll 1997, 995f). 
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 Market overview: The electronic market provides a structured view of the offerings in a market using a 
centralized directory, order book or product catalog. Prominent examples are product catalogs in retail-
ing sites, comparison sites as well Web service directories (see Table 2). 
 Price discovery: Markets and in particular auctions offer dynamic pricing employing a variety of mech-
anisms (e.g. Dutch or English auction, single or double auction) and are traditionally a powerful instru-
ment when price determination is a problem. This is the case due to abundant competition or a lack of 
competition in many commodity markets, e.g. for unique collectors’ items. Auction markets aim for an 
improved allocation of resources and are also used for demand pooling (see pooling sites in Table 2). 
Examples, such as the maternity care auctions in the Netherlands, illustrate that auctions may also lead 
to a restructuring of markets (Smits and Janssen 2008).  
 Customer decision support: Given the breadth and complexity of products available online, intermedi-
aries provide various forms of customer decision support from recommender systems based on individ-
ual customer profiles, the analysis of aggregate shopping patterns (collaborative filtering) or the inclu-
sion of customer product reviews and ratings (user generated content). Reviews and ratings are also of-
fered to assess the quality of vendors (and customers).  
 Information sharing: Transactions between businesses typically require a broader set of information to 
coordinate activities. Platforms for supply chain collaboration, such as GXS, GS1 or e2open support the 
exchange of planning and status information between many participants. This comprises, for instance, 
the publication of demand forecasts of large manufacturers with their suppliers or the consolidation of 
status information to track physical goods. 
 Product innovation: The concept of crowdsourcing has transformed research and development process-
es in several industries. Business partners and sometimes even end customers actively collaborated via 
one platform to develop a specific product or service. For instance, the Innocentive platform is used to 
develop, publish and evaluate ideas for new products or Redesignme.com consists of a community that 
helps in redesigning products so that they become marketable. 
Second, from the perspective of an electronic market provider, there is competition between governance models, 
specifically markets and network arrangements. Moreover, marketplace intermediaries operate in an environ-
ment of competition among marketplaces (e.g. Weitzman 2010), other intermediaries and direct sellers (for by-
passing, see e.g. Weber 1994). They face challenges, such as conflicting relationships, partner resistance, as well 
as balancing the interests of trading partners. Their success seems not only contingent on the breadth of the of-
  Twenty Years of Electronic Markets Research, page 10/23 
fered services but also on governance and ownership structures. Depending on various contingencies (e.g. mar-
ket transparency, market fragmentation) the electronic markets’ history has shown various opportunities for dis- 
and re-intermediation strategies (e.g. Giaglis et al. 2002). When market power was combined with the develop-
ment and the operation of a market platform, these platforms were often rejected. This is in line with Malone et 
al.’s prediction of a move from biased to unbiased markets.  
Third, in the institutional design dimension, electronic markets offer an institutionalized transaction environ-
ment. This includes regulatory functions, such as market access (e.g. requirements, registrations) and the availa-
bility of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms (e.g. protection against insider trading) as well as legal func-
tions that determine contract law, dispute resolution, and the transfer of property rights.  
 
3. Propositions for the Future of Electronic Markets 
Compared to a description of the value that has already become apparent in existing electronic markets, forecast-
ing future sources of value for intermediaries is more difficult. In order to stimulate the discussion about future 
trends of electronic markets this position paper suggests six propositions.  
Proposition 1: Intermediated topologies of electronic markets reduce dependencies in value chains 
As mentioned above, electronic markets provide an infrastructure that aims at facilitating transactions between 
buyers and sellers. In most of today’s value chains, this takes place between various tiers, e.g. between end cus-
tomers and distributors, between manufacturers and their suppliers and so on. In such settings intermediated (or 
centralized) topologies reduce the interface complexity from n * (n-1) to n * 2 connections. This also reduces the 
dependencies in value chains and thus the coordination efforts.
2
 All examples listed in Table 2 are centralized 
markets with a market provider acting as intermediary between buyers and sellers. In principle, markets can also 
exist in a decentralized form, i.e. all actors interacting directly using standards, rules and plans which were pre-
viously agreed upon (e.g. within an industry). Since these reciprocal interdependencies require considerable 
standardization efforts and are prone to conflicts, centralized topologies feature pooled interdependencies which 
add structure to the transactions between the participants and reduce the potential for conflict (Kumar and van 
Dissel 1996, 287). They are also advantageous compared to sequential interdependencies which are typically 
                                                          
2
 Coordination is the management of dependencies between activities (Malone and Crowston 1994, 90). 
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found in supply chains where each party forwards information to the adjacent partner, but where an overall per-
spective is missing. The advantage of centralized electronic markets is supported by empirical research which 
shows that the number of messages required and the information quality in a centralized market with a limited 
number of brokers is always superior to decentralized market designs and also hierarchies (Talalayevsky and 
Hershauer 1997). Thus, the first proposition argues that in view of vertical disintegration, flexible co-creation 
concepts and modularized service-oriented architectures, centralized platforms will receive a growing im-
portance to coordinate economic activity. 
Proposition 2: Increasingly complex value systems sustain the proliferation of electronic markets 
If economic production relies increasingly on flexibly coordinating products and services, classical sequential 
value chains will also become more complex. Figure 1 depicts electronic markets as nodes between multiple ac-
tors, which transact within an institutional environment. While Figure 1 suggests relatively simple transactions, 
the unbundling of products and services requires multiple transactions (and markets) to contract complex prod-
ucts or service bundles. This could open up the possibilities for intermediaries that configure, offer and monitor 
solutions, which comprise products from various providers as well as marketplaces. For example, some services 
in the area of financial advisory already pursue a life cycle view of business relationships and create individual 
solutions from a broad range of services including checking accounts, financing and insurances. We envisage 
similar bundled services for mobility, computing services, independent living in the third age and the like. This 
will also involve the extension of electronic markets in new domains, such as maternity care, emission rights, 
and software apps (cf. Table 2). The transformative power was illustrated by successful markets, such as eBay or 
the Apple App Store (MacMillan 2009), which created new markets by crafting and enhancing the rules and 
functionalities of their service. Like the first proposition, the second expects that the role of electronic markets in 
the economic environment will increase. In addition, in the future we will see a more interwoven landscape of 
distributed and cascading electronic marketplaces with some markets acting as meta- or sub-markets.  
 
Figure 1: Electronic markets as intermediaries in a supply chain 
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Proposition 3: All-in-one marketplaces increasingly combine various modes of governance  
Early electronic markets, such as the auctions in financial exchanges and the flight schedules as well as capacity 
management in the computerized reservation systems, provided a limited set of coordination mechanisms. While 
these systems are still operating successfully, electronic markets in other industries have combined several coor-
dination mechanisms as part of their business model. Examples, such as Elemica or e2open, illustrate extended 
transaction and life-cycle support beyond electronic auctions. In fact, the three generic market functionalities 
yield a variety of opportunities for market operators to add value within value chains. So-called “all-in-one-
markets” (Kambil et al. 1999) feature a variety of coordination mechanisms, which link the possibility of com-
petitive bidding to determine a price and to keep the pressure of competition on the one hand with the advantages 
of a predictable relationship to encourage relationship specific investments (non-contractible issues) and func-
tionalities for closer collaboration (e.g. Markus and Christiaanse 2003) on the other. A combination of market 
and hierarchical components (Holland and Lockett 1997, 485) could either occur sequentially with the bilateral 
execution of a number of transactions following after an auction was conducted or in a concurrent fashion where 
trading mechanisms are available on one platform. Examples for the latter are Click2Procure which is the buy-
side marketplace of Siemens AG in the B2B-domain and the well-known options from eBay in the B2C area 
(Hasker and Sickles 2010, 10). Thus, the third proposition argues that the nodes shown in Figure 1 will become 
more complex in themselves by combining various modes of governance. 
Proposition 4: Lower signalling cost shape new and improved market mechanisms  
Electronic markets are at the heart of flexible pricing in many industries. Sophisticated solutions for flexible 
pricing and price signalling have emerged, e.g. in the airline industry. As airlines’ capacity is fixed in the short 
term, they have been using yield management techniques (price differentiation) for years (e.g. Klein and 
Loebbecke 2003). In a period of intense competition from low cost carriers, airlines use their Web sites to signal 
price variations for different flights and also show the number of available seats in a particular price category. 
While this does not offer direct price negotiations, it allows passengers to pick flights based on their price-time 
preferences and thereby contributes to a levelling of demand. A similar approach is pursued by utility compa-
nies. Based on demand predictions and smart metering
3
, they are offering lower prices at times of low demand. 
Even in an industry limited by legal constraints (e.g. Reimers 1995), market mechanisms prevail and secondary 
                                                          
3
 Supported by smart metering technology utility companies might even control some equipment of companies 
or even households in order to generate demand for electricity in times of spare capacity (e.g. to run the com-
pressor of a refrigerator) or lower demand by taking certain pieces of equipment off line. 
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markets were created by intermediaries (e.g. Priceline, Qfly). The future will also see a stronger diffusion of 
flexible pricing in B2B electronic commerce with innovations in differential pricing (in revenue management, 
procurement, and supply chain coordination), and mechanisms for the evaluation of complex and multi-
dimensional bids (Bichler et al. 2010). These features are not “one time” innovations, but will require constant 
reassessment and improvement. For example, market operators, such as eBay, are in a unique position to monitor 
auctioning behaviour and develop or adjust auction rules and parameters. Over the years, eBay has become an 
innovator, introducing auction bots for automatic bidding, refined review mechanisms for buyers and sellers in 
order to ensure the fulfilment of the respective obligations (delivery of promised goods and payment) or semi-
nars to teaching bidding behaviour. Phenomena like “sniping”, bidding in the last seconds of an auction, show 
the ingenuity and energy of bidders (Bapna 2003). eBay is probably also one of the largest market research sites 
as they document all auctions and make anonymous auction data available for academic research. Amazon has 
already made information from their platform part of their web services offering (Alexa Web Information Ser-
vice).  
Proposition 5: Technological innovation in standards and services will add value  
In addition to the industry- and business-oriented aspects of the electronic markets’ evolution, IT-based innova-
tions will continue as important enabler for electronic markets. On the one hand, service-oriented concepts re-
quire centralized platforms that support the publication, configuration, and management of services across multi-
ple actors and systems. Among the solutions emerging in this domain are the Universal Service Description Lan-
guage (USDL), Universal Description and Discovery (UDDI) and the Business Process Modeling Notation 
(BPMN). Ultimately, they will enable electronic marketplaces to become part of more complex value systems by 
facilitating a larger variety of service configuration. On the other hand, cloud computing has shown that most 
local applications may also be hosted on external platforms. Combining the software-as-a-service (SaaS) idea 
with the functionalities of application stores (from Apple, Nokia or others), electronic markets might become the 
operating system of many value chains. While the business partners prefer standardized transactions and will ad-
vocate shared conventions for processes, services and data, the market place providers – in particular first mov-
ers – may prefer proprietary (back-end) solutions in order to achieve a competitive advantage over other provid-
ers. Thus, likely outcomes are technical configurations that combine standardized and proprietary elements. Sec-
ond movers might emphasize standardization as a differentiating value proposition.  
Proposition 6: Social networking will transform electronic markets  
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Finally, electronic markets will experience a revival of the social. One of the major trends in recent years has 
been the rise of social networking. In contrast to the commercialization of the Web and the anonymous logic of 
collaborative filtering, individuals as citizens, consumers or other members of the society are trying to regain 
control. They use the Web – and more generally social media – for their private enterprises of socializing, shar-
ing, voicing their opinions etc. Recommendation sites (e.g. Rotten Tomatoes, iLike, Musicovery, Goodreads) 
and reputation management strategies will increasingly become integrated in the market overview function and 
influence buying decisions. As mentioned, the strengths of markets lie in efficient resource allocation based on 
price signals. While the diffusion of IT has undoubtedly lead to more market and price transparency globally, 
competitors drive each other to provide price information or intermediaries have created a business based on 
product and price comparisons. Yet, markets generally and auctions specifically are social mechanisms to estab-
lish a price (Smith 1990). The rise of social media and networking (based on electronic communication) is a re-
minder that individuals tend to make decisions based on opinions, recommendations and feedback by their 
friends and peer group.  
 
4. Risks and Sustainability of Electronic Markets 
Given the continued success and transformative power of electronic markets, a key question remains: is this de-
velopment sustainable? First of all, the adoption of an electronic market in its target community and the active 
participation of its members are inherently linked to the market’s liquidity. Many market initiatives were not 
successful in attracting a critical mass of transaction volume and thus were discontinued. Research has shown 
that explanations are often not technological, but organizational and cultural in nature (e.g. Reimers 1995). As 
mentioned earlier, intermediaries face challenges, such as bypassing, conflicting relationships, partner resistance, 
balancing the interests of trading partners. Success often seems not only contingent on the breadth of services 
that they are offering but also influenced by governance and ownership structures. When market power was 
combined with the development and operation of a platform, these initiatives were regularly rejected (e.g. Alt 
and Klein 1999). However, deliberations about social, technical, economic, political and environmental issues 
are bound to fail if they neglect the phenomenon of risk. As mentioned in the introductory section, the financial 
crisis has highlighted the increasing exposure to risk that can easily and swiftly spread around the globe. In view 
of the pervasiveness of electronic trading, it is difficult to clearly separate traditional and ICT related risks. Beck 
(1992) has coined the notion of risk society to describe a situation in which technical progress yields new risks, 
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which absorb a growing amount of societies’ attention and problem solving capabilities. It seems that well 
known risks have become exacerbated and more contagious since they spread around the globe as easily as news 
or ideas.  
First, the notion of infrastructure risks or cyber risks (Bremmer and Gordon 2011) highlights that communica-
tion networks have become vital infrastructures for the economy and indeed the entire society. As communica-
tion infrastructures are available on an ubiquitous scale and mission critical for a fast growing number of do-
mains, including energy provision, healthcare, traffic control and commerce, societies’ dependence and vulnera-
bilities have dramatically increased. The temporary suspension of the EU Emissions Trading System on January 
19, 2011 in response to recurrent security breaches (European Commission 2011) is just one example of the vul-
nerability of trading infrastructures. Technical flaws have thus undermined what has been carefully designed 
from a competitive and regulatory point of view (European Commission 2010). Other examples are the cascad-
ing network risks in the globally distributed production and supply chains: severe weather conditions, industrial 
action, disruptions caused by contagious diseases in one part of the world can (and do) affect operations in other 
parts – often within days.  
Second, transaction and price risks emerge with the dissemination of electronic markets (Clemons and Reddi 
1994). The transformation from floor trading to electronic trading has illustrated how trading was embedded in a 
broad range of social practices of monitoring and signalling (Clemons and Weber 1997). Purely electronic 
modes of trading might yield new forms of risk and require new mechanisms of dealing with risk. To contain 
transaction and price risk as well as uncertainty on the effects of ICT on industrial organization, Clemons (2007, 
2) suggests to develop “enough pattern recognition skill to convert an unknown and uncertain situation to a 
known and risky one”. One facet of opportunism related risk has become more prevalent in the electronic mar-
ketspace: leakage of sensitive information. As information can be copied and communicated at virtually no cost, 
the risk of massive and systematic leakages of trade information has increased by an order of magnitude.  
Third, systemic risks are prevalent when electronic systems interact almost autonomously among each other. An 
early contribution in Electronic Markets has described the effects of communication speed and the stability of 
trading systems (Addor 1992). While Addor was expecting that the instantaneous communication of fluctuations 
in electronic markets would yield more stable markets, the opposite outcome is also possible. There have been 
instances where automated trading lead to a downward spiral in financial markets. The intransparencies involved 
in program or algorithmic trading “have overtaken the industry [... and] for better or worse, the computers are 
now in control” (Salmon and Stokes 2010). More recently, the problem of system critical companies received 
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considerable attention. While innovation in the electronic marketspace often sparks a virtuous cycle of competi-
tive countermoves, further innovation and productivity growth (Farrell 2003), a few companies achieve a speed 
of growth and quasi-monopolistic market positions, which make them – at least temporarily – system critical 
(too big to fail) within a relative short period of time (Johnson and Kwak 2010). Such companies require specific 
regulatory responses, geared at the relative position of these companies in their respective market environments. 
Technology and market forces alone do not seem to prevent the rise of biased markets. 
Overall, the discussion of technology-induced risks on electronic markets has been quite limited. The analysis of 
the root causes of the financial crisis has yielded controversial results: some argue that the markets in principle 
are working, while others call for much stricter regulation. Whatever the final verdict may be, the crisis has high-
lighted the role of regulation for markets to function but also that electronic trading is happening at a level which 
is difficult to control: The financial services industry has become a truly global industry with mind boggling vol-
umes of transactions if compared to the size of national budgets or even gross national products. As a result 
many financial services institutions have become system critical to an extent that countries are risking bankrupt-
cy in order to keep individual banks alive. The regulatory side of providing incentives and safeguards for a sus-
tainable and accountable development has not kept pace and in numerous instances has failed dramatically. The 
balancing of risks and accountability did not work. A comparative study (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2010) highlights 
the salience of institutional reforms and social governance, which have helped in particular emerging economies 
to respond to the crisis effectively. Flyvberg et al. (2003) in their study of risks related to infrastructure (mega) 
projects claim that more accountability is needed to mitigate risks and participatory and deliberative approaches 
in order to achieve better informed and more democratic decisions.  
If electronic markets incur new and extended risks, these risks need to be considered when discussing benefits 
and gains of electronic markets and should be internalized, i.e. carried by those who participate and benefit from 
the markets. However, regulators are facing a dilemma between unnecessary administrative burdens caused by 
regulation and the risk incurred as a result of insufficient regulation and control. While “smarter” regulation may 
be called for, the inherent limitations of setting productive rules in a global environment with regulatory compe-
tition and highly mobile and resourceful actors need also to be acknowledged. The EU Emissions Trading Sys-
tem mentioned above is an example for coordinated efforts to develop, amend and develop regulation for a 
young and dynamic market in light of ongoing economic and climate crisis as well as fraudulent actions.  
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5. Conclusions 
Although the research field “electronic markets” has been a topic of research in academia and practice for over 
two decades, the concept of electronic markets appears more relevant for today’s distributed and networked eco-
nomic systems than ever. Starting from the available research in the electronic markets field, this position paper 
suggests an extension of the existing knowledge by proposing a multi-dimensional framework. Starting from the 
empirical diversity of electronic markets, it argues that the design of electronic markets is not driven by cost-
evaluations only. In fact, it requires understanding the intricate relationships of technological potentials, market 
dynamics and the rules defined within the institutional environment. For that purpose, it links micro layer phe-
nomena, such as business model innovation with macro layer phenomena (transformation of market environ-
ments) and shows how technological innovations, competitive dynamics and rule setting (from standardization to 
regulation) are linked and require realignment between individual incentives and the interests of the community. 
This also calls for distinct educational and research efforts at a time, when most educational institutions seem to 
be geared towards increasingly specific micro analyses rather than taking a broader, systemic and interdiscipli-
nary perspective.  
Extension of electronic markets across all levels 
While pure play electronic market mechanisms seemed limited to a small array of application areas, in particular 
the computerized reservation systems in tourism, the exchanges in the financial sector and some examples of 
electronic supermarkets in the retail sector, today’s picture of existing electronic markets features a much greater 
diversity of application areas for electronic markets. More products and services have become tradable on elec-
tronic markets and innovative trading mechanisms have emerged. At the same time, communication rich envi-
ronments have developed which facilitate crowdsourcing for news, ratings, predictions, services or innovative 
ideas. Successful companies have learnt how to mobilize, facilitate and benefit from social production. Moreo-
ver, within the competitive ecosystem of market platforms (Clemons & Woodard, 2011), highly successful elec-
tronic market platforms have emerged, such as eBay or the Apple iTunes App Store, which have created new 
market segments and spurred systems of innovation.  
Increasing complexity of market platforms 
At the same time, the understanding of the phenomenon “electronic market” has progressed. Where some isolat-
ed technologies were used to link businesses in the beginning, today’s picture comprises a broad set of design 
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options to realize added value to market participants. Overall, the complexity of electronic market architectures 
and governance forms, such as all-in-one markets or mixed mode governance, is increasing. Although the App 
Store may be a market from the end customer perspective, it involves hierarchical relationships at least with 
some suppliers and a very strict institutional setting. From the business model perspective, the diffusion of an 
electronic market and the adoption by its potential users is highly contingent on numerous factors beyond the at-
tributes of the transactions. Although some sources of value for an intermediary are known on the business mod-
el level, the configuration of these value drivers still requires more research. Centralized or intermediated elec-
tronic market architectures appear to be promising, supported by ubiquitous infrastructure of the mobile Internet, 
which makes information easily available to some two billion potential participants. Higher degrees of interactiv-
ity and multimedia interfaces, widespread computer literacy and the growing standardization of processes and 
services in many industries are other examples. As a few global mega-platforms are emerging, important ques-
tions about their governance and the competition between those platforms arise.  
Sustainability as ongoing challenge 
Finally, the success of electronic markets in the broad sense raises fundamental issues of sustainability, market 
governance and the protection of economic, political and social institutions. Technology is changing the way we 
are living and working as well as our social, economic and political systems. Electronic markets have become 
large scale and critical infrastructures, whose failure has massive economic and social effects. The financial cri-
sis is only a reminder of the fact that we have joined a global risk society. This position paper has argued that 
institutional design orientated by principles of good, social governance and accountability not only reduces 
transaction costs, but is crucial for a sustainable development. However, it also recognizes the dynamic relation-
ship between innovation and regulation. Regulation within the institutional environment and setting of electronic 
markets assumes certain patterns of behavior on behalf of the market participants. Examples, such as “sniping”, 
illustrate that rules will be challenged by human creativity and inevitably yield unforeseen effects. Electronic 
markets need to adjust and, thus, require continuous monitoring and improvement. Understanding these dynam-
ics of electronic markets becomes even more important in view of more interconnections and the diffusion of 
electronic agents. Thus, like for every powerful (technological) concept, efforts are required to develop its poten-
tials and to contain risks at the same time. 
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